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Broderick: Justice Potter Stewart

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
HONORABLE VINCENT L. BRODERICK*

Justice Potter Stewartt has completed twenty-two years of service on
the Supreme Court of the United States. After twenty-two years of his
Supreme Court work, we can see that his well reasoned, concisely limited opinions have done much to give order and direction to our legal
world.
A review of the impact that Justice Stewart has had upon the law of
equal protection should be prefaced by a consideration of the major
events in his life prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court. Presumably these events helped shape his judicial perspective and style.
Potter Stewart was born in 1915. His father served several terms as
mayor of Cincinnati before becoming a member of the Ohio Supreme
Court. Thus, a tradition of public service was one of the early influences on the young Potter Stewart.'
The underpinning of his own public service was a fine education,
which he began at the University School in Cincinnati and continued
at Hotchkiss in Connecticut and at Yale. At Yale, Justice Stewart edited the Yale Daily News.2 Evidently, the rigorous demands of his college newspaper work did not impede his academic activities, for he
managed to garner a host of academic honors.' My research has not
made it clear whether the lucid and pithy writing style that characterizes his Supreme Court opinions was brought by Justice Stewart to
Yale or developed through his work on the Yale Daily News. The style
appears in his college editorials, in which we see some of the first indications of what would later become one of his hallmarks: his independence from narrow ideological labels.
It is not possible to categorize the ideology of Potter Stewart today,
* Federal District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York; A.B., Princeton
University, 1941; LL.B., Harvard University, 1948.
t Judge Broderick's presentation and this article were prepared prior to Justice Stewart's
announcement of his plan to retire at the end of the 1980 Term.
1. J. Israel, Potter Stewart in IV THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1789-1969, at 2921-22 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
2. Id See also Paschal, Mr. Justice Stewart on the Court of Appeals, 1959 DUKE L.J. 325,
326.
3. J. Israel, supra note 1, at 2922. See also 4 YALE L. REP. No. 3 at 10-11 (Winter 1958).
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and this was probably also true in his Yale years. His family had been
active in the Republican party, and the Yale student body was generally regarded as Republican by birthright. Yet, the young Potter Stewart expressed support for at least some of the New Deal policies of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt.4 Justice Stewart in later years was to say
of the terms "liberal" and "conservative": "I have some difficulty understanding what these terms mean even in the field of political life or
in the legislative or executive branches, and I find it impossible to know
what they mean when they are carried over to judicial work." 5 What is
clear is that upon completion of his undergraduate career at Yale, Potter Stewart was acutely aware that change is a fact of American life and
that such change has an impact upon traditional values. As class orator, he spoke of the "New Deal and the changing Constitution" and
noted that he and his classmates were "keenly sensible of the fact that
many of the institutions and ideas that our fathers have known, and we
have known. . . [have] already begun to crumble." 6
Justice Stewart had a year of post-graduate study on a Henry fellowship at Cambridge University in England before he entered Yale Law
School.7 It was an interesting time for a future Supreme Court Justice
to be at Yale Law School. Only a few years had passed since the
Supreme Court of the early and mid-1930's had overruled, upon substantive due process grounds, various New Deal measures designed, for
good or for ill, to bring the country out of the Great Depression.8
Many of our nation's brightest minds-including those of the Yale Law
School faculty-were drawn to the problem of what the proper role of
the Supreme Court of the United States of America should be. Certain
Yale Law School teachers-so-called "realists" in legal thought-rejected the myth that judges somehow discovered and impartially applied a stable body of laws.9 According to these legal realists, the value
judgments, personal habits, and social background of the judges influence their decisions in degrees ranging from subtle to blatant. To the
legal realists, the 1932-1936 Supreme Court exemplified a judiciary that
substituted the philosophies and policies of its members for those of the
members of the legislative and executive branches of the government.' 0
4. J. Israel, supra note 1, at 2922; YALE L. REP., supra note 3, at 10-1l.
5. J. Israel, supra note 1, at 2921.
6. Id. at 2922.
7. Id.
8. Id. During this period the Court struck down "laws fixing minimum wages and maximum hours of employment, laws fixing prices, and laws regulating business activities." Lincoln
Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). Since 1937, the
Court has struck down no law on substantive due process grounds. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

591 (9th ed. 1975).

9. J. Israel, supra note 1, at 2922.
10. Id.
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The realists emphasized the necessity of developing the ability to recognize and to identify the policy considerations necessarily encountered
in dealing with complex legal problems. They taught that a personal
policy choice was virtually inevitable in rendering a judicial opinion
and that the greatest sin was trying to cover up the fact. It was better to
make that personal policy choice clear, thus facilitating change in the
decision itself if it became apparent that other policies should be taken
into account.
None of us can know with certainty what effect the turmoil surrounding the 1932-1936 Supreme Court and the teachings of Yale Law
School's realists had in shaping Potter Stewart's role model of a
Supreme Court Justice. We know that Potter Stewart achieved high
marks throughout his law school career," and we might reasonably infer that he developed his mastery of the basic analytical tools of his
profession under the influence of those legal realists. Judge Stewart
was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1958 by President Eisenhower.
One of his professors at Yale Law School was to comment that he was
"one of the most intelligent, dynamic and personally attractive students
' 2
who have [sic] attended the Yale Law School in the past thirty years."'
In one of the last conventional steps in his legal career, Potter Stewart joined a Wall Street firm upon his graduation in 194 1.'1He had
been working at that firm less than a year when the Japanese attacked
Pearl Harbor. He joined the Navy and "spent most of the war as a
deck officer on oil tankers serving in the Atlantic and Mediterranean."' 14 In his own words, his service career consisted largely of
"floating around in a a sea of 100 octane gas, bored to death ninetynine per cent of the time and scared to death one per cent."' 5
As it did for so many of us, the war exposed Potter Stewart to a
broader circle than he would ordinarily have expected to encounter on
Wall Street. His service as defense counsel in several summary courtmartial proceedings' 6 may not have contributed to his ability to deal
with corporate legal problems, but it is probable that the exposure later
served him well in grappling with the problem of making the legal system available to everyone, both in theory and in economically practical
terms as well.
Potter Stewart left the Navy with three battle stars' 7 and, apparently,
1I.J.

Israel, supra note 1,at 2922.
12. YALE L. REP., supra note 3, at 11 (quoting Professor Ashbel G. Gulliver, Dean of Yale
Law School during Justice Stewart's law student days).
13. J. Israel, supra note 1, at 2922.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2923.
17. Id. at 2922.
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very little taste for resuming his New York practice. After a brief sojourn in New York City, he moved to Cincinnati and joined one of that
city's leading firms."8 He developed a practice that included litigation,
and he defended several indigent criminal defendants, spanning the
spectrum from murder' 9 to much more minor affairs. He soon followed in his father's footsteps and entered politics. He became a member of the city council of Cincinnati and served one term as vicemayor.20
In 1954, President Eisenhower nominated Potter Stewart, then thirtynine years old, to fill a vacancy on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 2'
His careers as newspaper editor, navy officer, politician, and lawyer
were over, and his career in the federal judiciary began.
In his next four years on the Sixth Circuit Court, Judge Stewart dealt
with some cases germane to our general theme of equal protection. He
wrote an opinion on segregation in Ohio public schools,2 2 for example,
overturning a lower court decision that allowed segregation to continue
until new schools were built.2 1 In a right-to-counsel case, he stood
alone in his declaration that the fourteenth amendment rights of the
defendant
had been violated and that the court should do something
24
about it.
Justice Stewart's performance on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
drew attention, and when Justice Harold H. Burton resigned from the
Supreme Court in 1958, President Eisenhower appointed Judge Stewart
to fill the vacancy. 25 At age forty-three Potter Stewart was the second
youngest Associate Justice of the Supreme Court since antebellum
days. 26 His youth was duly noted at the time:
The appointment of Potter Stewart to the Supreme Court has given
us notice that a new generation is taking over in law as well as elsewhere. Of his predecessors, only Mr. Justice Brennan finished law
school so late as 1931. With Mr. Justice Stewart, the year is advanced
to 1941 and the years of maturation advanced still further. He alone of
the justices had his first serious encounter with the law after the revolution of 1937 and after the Supreme Court, in response to repeated importunities, began really to function as the guardian of civil rights.
18. Id. at 2923.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956).
23. Id. at 855.
24. The state court decision was People v. Henderson, 343 Mich. 465, 72 N.w.2d 177 (1955),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956). Justice Stewart was the sole dissenter in the court of appeals
opinion affirming the district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Henderson v.
Bannan, 256 F.2d 363, 385 (6th Cir. 1958).
25. J. Israel, supra note 1, at 2923.
26. Id.
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Furthermore, it is important to note that Stewart's world has been one
in which the teachings of Pound and even Llewellyn and Frank have
long since settled into the fabric of the legal order. These old victories
he undoubtedly accepts, but only casually, much as one accepts the abolition of the forms of action. He thus does not have the passion of a
Black or a Murphy in fashioning a new rampart. Neither does he have
the feeling one senses in Harlan of puzzlement and wonder at a strange,
new landscape. And, certainly, he does not smart under the disillusionment which gave overtones of tragedy to Jackson's career.
The point of all this perhaps is that Stewart will bring few new values
within the compass of the law. But the point is also that he can be
relied on not to depreciate those values he finds already there ...
Happily, he inherits a more spacious legal world than did his predecessors. Perhaps his great task-and eventually his great achievement-2 7
will be to contribute toward making that legal world an orderly one.
And in this, he has certainly succeeded.
JUSTICE STEWART'S JUDICIAL "STYLE"

One who immerses himself in Justice Stewart's judicial product
learns that there is a Stewart judicial style. I use the word "style" to
encompass substantive approach as well as mode of presentation,
which is one way of explaining that I plan to deal with Justice Stewart's
"style" at some length. I perceive this judicial style as an integral part
of Justice Stewart's contribution to the development of equal protection
principles.
At the outset, Justice Stewart's judicial style can best be described as
entailing the application of a litany of maxims:
(a) shorter is preferred over longer;
(b) narrower is preferred over broader;
(c) no issue is to be decided that does not have to be decided;
(d) apply practical standards, not platitudes or generalities; and
(e) respect precedent.
No one of these maxims alone is startling, and there is nothing remarkable in the application of all of them in any given opinion. It is
truly remarkable that Justice Stewart managed to apply all of these
maxims in virtually all of his opinions throughout his twenty-two years
on the Supreme Court. The product of this fidelity is a body of opinions which are logical, restrained, eminently readable, and terse.
A mechanism through which Justice Stewart frequently applies these
maxims is the one-paragraph concurring opinion. In these concurring
opinions we encounter gems of practicality, caution, and economy of
words.
27. Paschal, supra note 2, at 340.
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Thus, in United States v. Watson,28 where the Court held that an
arrest in a public place without a warrant was permissible, Justice
Stewart was concerned that the majority opinion might be applied in
situations beyond the facts of that particular case. He expressed this
concern in a concurring opinion of three sentences:
The arrest in this case was made upon probable cause in a public
place in broad daylight. The Court holds that this arrest did not violate
the Fourth Amendment, and I agree. The Court does not decide, nor
could it decide in this case, whether or under what circumstances an
officer must obtain a warrant before he may lawfully enter a private
place to effect an arrest.2 9
Another example of Justice Stewart's short, pithy style can be found
in his one paragraph concurrence in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania.3 0 At issue
was the constitutional validity of an 1860 Pennsylvania statute which
gave Pennsylvania jurors in a criminal case the power to assess costs
against the defendant, even if the defendant had been acquitted. Justice Stewart wrote:
It seems to me that, despite the Court's disclaimer, much of the reasoning in its opinion serves to cast grave constitutional doubt upon the
settled practice of many States to leave to the unguided discretion of a
jury the nature and degree of punishment to be imposed upon a person
convicted of a criminal offense. Though I have serious questions about
the wisdom of that practice, its constitutionality is quite a different matter. In the present case it is enough for me that Pennsylvania allows a
jury to punish a defendant after finding him not guilty. That I think,
violates the most rudimentary concept of due process of law. I
Justice Stewart's penchant for brevity also allows him to turn a nice
phrase from time to time. In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp ,32 the
issue before the Court was whether federal courts should hear the due
process claims of debtors who felt they should be allowed some form of
hearing before their property could be seized. In the opinion for the
Court, Justice Stewart made it clear that rights in property were basic
civil rights. I quote from the opinion, and draw attention to the short,
sweet, and yet powerful couplet immediately after the first quoted sentence:
IT]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Propertydoes not have rights. People have rights. The right
to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right
to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "personal" right, whether the
"property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings ac28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

423 U.S. 411 (1976).
Id. at 433 (citations omitted).
382 U.S. 399 (1966).
Id. at 405.
405 U.S. 538 (1972).
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count. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could
have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil
rights has long been recognized. Congress recognized these rights in
1871 when it enacted the predecessor of §§ 1983 and 1343(3). We do
no more than reaffirm the judgment of Congress today.3 3
Respect for precedent is another characteristic of Justice Stewart.
Perhaps the best example of this trait appears in his dissent in Mitchell
v. W T Grant Co.34 In Mitchell, the Court upheld a state statute that
permitted seizure of a debtor's property without a prior hearing. The
Court had stricken a similar statute just two years earlier in Fuentes v.
Shevin ,3 an opinion written by Justice Stewart himself. In his dissent
in Mitchell, Justice Stewart despaired of the Court's indifference to
precedent:
In short, this case is constitutionally indistinguishable from Fuentes v.
Shevin, and the Court today has simply rejected the reasoning of that
case and adopted instead the analysis of the Fuentes dissent ...
It seems to me that unless we respect the constitutional decisions of
this Court, we can hardly expect that others will do so. A substantial
departure from precedent can only be justified, I had thought, in the
light of experience with the application of the rule to be abandoned or
in the light of an altered historical environment. Yet the Court today
has unmistakably overruled a considered decision of this Court that is
barely two years old, without pointing to any change in either societal
perceptions or basic constitutional understandings that might justify
this total disregard of stare decisis...
* . ' The only perceivable change that has occurred since Fuentes is
in the makeup of this Court.
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in
our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution
is little different from the two political branches of the Government.
No misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court
and to the
36
system of law which it is our abiding mission to serve.
Perhaps the Court listened to this strong dissent, because the Fuentes
holding was resurrected after Mitchell in the case of North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 37 This about face prompted the following

tongue-in-cheek concurrence: "It is gratifying to note that my report of
the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin, . . . see Mitchell v. WT Grant
Co.. .
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

.

. seems to have been greatly exaggerated.

Cf. S. Clemens,

Id. at 552 (citations omitted).
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
416 U.S. at 634-36.
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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cable from Europe to the Associated Press, quoted in ... Mark Twain:
A Biography .. "38
One of the important ends served by Justice Stewart's concurring
opinions has been to delineate, in clear and direct language, the precise
holdings of the Court. He chooses his words and phrases precisely. He
says, and means, "thus far and no further." When Justice Stewart has
been on the Supreme Court some seven years, a perceptive author
found the possible roots of this aspect of his style in his court of appeals
experience:
One of Justice Stewart's prime concerns is with the Supreme Court's
responsibility to clarify-to state precisely what the law is, and thus
give guidance to lawyers and to federal and state judges. The Justice's
concern with guidance perhaps can be traced to his own experience as a
court of appeals judge. The first opinion he wrote for the Supreme
Court reflects this concern; in it he wrote that it would "promote analysis ...of the case to emphasize at the outset what it does not involve."
The vehicle which Justice Stewart most often utilizes for clarification is
the concurring opinion, whether in support of a majority opinion or in
opposition to a dissent. In concurring opinions, he often states what is
and what is not decided, what action is required of the lower courts to
conform to the Court's holding, or why the dissent may be misinterpreting the majority opinion.
Another example of Justice Stewart's clarification of a holding of the
Court appears in Elrod v.Burns,' which involved a dismissal of a public employee for political reasons. Justice Brennan wrote a three-man
plurality opinion holding that the plaintiffs had been unconstitutionally discharged. 4 In a concurring opinion,42 Justice Stewart identified
the "single substantive question" presented by Elrod to be "whether a
nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee can be discharged or threatened with discharge from a job that he is satisfactorily
performing upon the sole ground of his political beliefs."4 3 The
Supreme Court later extended the doctrine of Elrod beyond nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential governent employees in Branti v. Finkel.'
Three Justices, including Justice Stewart, dissented.4 5 Justice Stewart,
who did not write in dissent, joined that portion of the dissenting opinion that indicated the majority had strayed beyond the limits set forth
in his Elrod concurrence.'
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 608.
Note, Mr,Justice Potter Stewart, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 526, 527-28 (1965).
427 U.S. 347 (1976).
Joining Justice Brennan were Justices White and Marshall. Id.
Id. at 374.

43. Id. at 375.
44.

100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980).

45. Id. at 1296.
46. Id.
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While it is not precisely a matter of style, but rather one of judicial
philosophy, I note one more hallmark of Justice Stewart's judicial approach: his reluctance to subscribe to total prohibition of the exercise
of governmental power in any given area. The development of this
particular aspect of his judicial approach may stem from the political
and judicial events during his formative years in the 1930's when the
Supreme Court frequently limited or eliminated government action in
many economic areas.47 Professor J.H. Israel has commented on this
aspect of the Stewart approach: "Stewart rejected any attempt to impose a total prohibition against the exercise of government power in a
particular area .. .but was willing, in light of the particular case
before him, to impose such limited restrictions on the use of that power
as were necessary to prevent its abuse."48
CONTRIBUTIONS TO EQUAL PROTECTION WHILE ON
THE WARREN COURT

One of Justice Stewart's significant opinions for the Warren Court
was Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.4

The issue presented was simple:

can a homeowner refuse to sell his or her home to an individual because that individual is black? The Court considered the case in 1968,
the year in which Congress passed the Fair Housing Act.5" The focus
of the legal arguments was on whether the Civil Rights Act of 18661t
should be given a broad or narrow interpretation. Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop52
erty."

The defendant argued that the history of section 1982 indicated that
it was designed solely to block the infamous "Black Codes 53 adopted
by many southern -states to prevent blacks from buying property. In
addition, the defendant argued that in Hurd v. Hedge,r4 the Supreme
47. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
48. J. Israel, supra note I,at 2927.
49. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-63 (1976). Indeed, some of the Justices dissented in Jones on the
grounds that the Fair Housing Act, to become effective at the end of the year, would provide the
relief which the plaintiff sought, and that is more appropriate for this relief to be provided by
direct congressional action rather than by the Supreme Court's interpretation of an ancient statute. 392 U.S. at 478. Justice Harlan, referring to the recent passage of the Housing Act, put it this
way: "The political process now having taken hold again in this very field, tI am at a loss to
understand why the Court should have deemed it appropriate or, in the circumstances of this case,
necessary to proceed with such precipitate and insecure strides." Id.
51. Civil Rights Act, ch, 31 § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
53. 392 U.S. at 426.
54. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
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Court had stated in dictum that section 1982 was directed only toward
"governmental action" and not action by private citizens."
One can almost see the addendum opinion that Justice Stewart might
have written in Hurd had he been on the Court in 1948. It would have
started with the words: "What the Court does not decide today, and
indeed what it cannot decide in the case before it . . . ." What he
could not write in 1948, Justice Stewart wrote, in substance, in 1968:
"It is true that a dictum in Hurd said that § 1982 was directed only
toward 'governmental action,' but neither Hurd nor any other case
before or since has presented that precise issue for adjudication in this
Court."5 6
We will never know how many plaintiffs' attorneys, between 1948
and 1968, decided, based on the Hurd dictum, that there was no basis
for a constitutional challenge to private housing discrimination. We do
know that in that twenty-year period no challenge to private housing
discrimination reached the Supreme Court. Until Jones, no Supreme
Court case had ever squarely presented the issue. Thus, we begin to
realize the significance of Justice Stewart's insistence that the Supreme
Court-for its own guidance as well as the guidance of others-carefully delineate what it is, and what it is not, deciding.
Having disposed of the argument that he was bound by precedent,
Justice Stewart considered the statute and concluded that it meant exactly what it said:
On its face, therefore, § 1982 appears to prohibit all discrimination
against Negroes in the sale or rental of property-discrimination by
private owners as well as discrimination by public authorities....
Stressing what they consider to be the revolutionary implications of so
literal a reading of § 1982, the respondents argue that Congress cannot
possibly have intended such a result. Our examination of the relevant
histor, however, persuades us that Congress meant exactly what it
said. 5
And in a later section:
Thus, when Congress provided in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act [of 1866]
that the right to purchase and lease property was to be enjoyed equally
throughout the United States by Negro and white citizens alike, it
plainly meant to secure that right against interference
from any source
58
whatever, whether governmental or private.
Through a rigorous historical analysis, Justice Stewart demonstrated
that the Black Codes constituted only one of the forms of discrimina55.
56.
57.
58.

392 U.S. at 436.
Id. at 419-20 (citations omitted).
Id. at 421-22.
Id. at 423-24.
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tion that prompted Congress to pass the 1866 Act.59 He noted that the
members of the 1866 Congress, being perceptive men, realized that custom and tradition could induce discrimination just as well as governmental action. 6° In perhaps the most striking blow to the defendant's
argument, Justice Stewart pointed out that the penalty provisions of the
Act prescribed specific punishment for only governmental agents acting
under color of law.6 ' He concluded that Congress intended the Act to
apply to two categories of offenders, those who discriminated against
blacks in property transactions, and those who engaged in such discrimination under the color of law. Only the smaller group, drawn for
the first, was singled out for punishment.6 2
Having determined the purpose of section 1982, Justice Stewart
turned to the issue of whether the Act was within the constitutional
power of Congress. He determined that it was. 63 He asserted that the
enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment, 64 which abolished slavery, "clothed 'Congress with power to pass alllaws necessary andproper
for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
States.' "65 Hence, Congress could determine that a private individual's refusal to sell real property to another merely because the prospective buyer was black was a "badge or incident of slavery," and it
was within Congress' power to pass laws to prohibit such conduct.66
I quote again from Justice Stewart:
At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure
under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy
whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man
can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least
this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation
cannot keep.67
Prior to Jones, the thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
1866 had been essentially dead areas of the law; after Jones, they came
to life. The vitality which Jones restored to the Civil Rights Act of
1866 paved the way for Runyon v. McCrary,68 in which Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court, applied a companion law6 9 to ban discrimination
59. Id. at 424-37.
60. Id. at 423.
61. Id. at 426.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 439.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 states: "Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation."
65. 392 U.S. at 439 (emphasis by the Court).

66. Id. at 441-43.
67. Id. at 443.

68. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat.
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in most private contracts.
Early commentators were fond of calling Justice Stewart the "swing
vote" on the Warren Court,7 0 primarily because they had difficulty
fitting him into the popular perception of an "activist-passivist" split
which had existed for a few years prior to his appointment.' While
Justice Stewart indeed cast the critical vote in a number of five-to-four
decisions by the Court, 2 he made important contributions in the many
cases in which his draft opinions drew other members of the Court to a
consensus. Such a case was United States v. Guest."
United States v. Guest involved a conspiracy to beat, threaten, and
murder blacks in Georgia in order to discourage them from using various public facilities. The conspirators were indicted, but the district
court dismissed the indictment on the authority of the 1883 Supreme
Court decision in the CivilRights Cases.v" The rationale of the dismissal was that the defendants were private individuals and that Congress
did not have the power under the fourteenth amendment to punish
conspiracies by private persons to violate the fourteenth amendment
rights of others; Congress could only adopt legislation to correct the
effect of prohibited state laws and state acts.75 Justice Clark, joined by
Justices Black and Fortas, took the position in Guest that Congress
could pass, and had passed, appropriate legislation to prevent private
conspiracies aimed at denying blacks their civil rights.76 In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Douglas, also took the position that Congress was empowered by the
fourteenth amendment to punish actions amounting to private discrimination or deprivation of basic civil rights.77 In all, six members of the
Court were prepared to overrule the 1883 decision in the Civil Rights
Cases. Justice Stewart wrote an opinion that ultimately became the
opinion of the Court, in which he found a way to achieve the ends
sought by the other Justices, without disturbing precedent.7 8
The manner in which he accomplished this was in keeping with the
Stewart style. A careful reading of the challenged indictment revealed
to Justice Stewart what the others had evidently ignored or overlooked-an allegation that the conspirators planned to bring about the
70. E.g., Note, smpra note 39, at 526.
71. Justices Frankfurter, Whitaker, Clark, and Harlan comprised the "passivist" group on
the Court. The "activist" group consisted of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas,
and Brennan. Id.
72. J. Israel, supra note 1, at 2925.
73. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
74. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
75. Id. at 11.
76. 383 U.S. at 761-62.
77. Id. at 777.
78. Id. at 746-60.
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arrest of blacks by falsely attributing criminal activities to them.7 9
Thus, Justice Stewart showed that the indictment in fact charged discrimination based on the requisite state action: false arrests would necessarily involve agents of the state.
His opinion in Guest pointed the way for plaintiffs in subsequent
civil rights cases. By including an allegation that the private discrimination complained of would eventually lead to state action, albeit unwitting state action, that would aid the private conspirators in depriving
blacks of their civil rights, plaintiffs could avail themselves of federal
court intervention. A cause of action giving rise to a fundamentally
distinct category of civil rights cases had been disclosed by Justice
Stewart's opinion; yet, no precedent had been disturbed.
Throughout Justice Stewart's tenure on the Court, he has evinced an
awareness of the potential dangers of unlimited expansion of federal
power. The tension between his concern for restraining government
and his interest in protecting the constitutional rights of all citizens has
become more evident in recent years. But the dynamic interplay between the values of equality and governmental restraint appeared in his
opinions during the years of the Warren Court. ° One of the important
"state action" cases, Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority,8' offers an
illustrative example.
In Burton, a private restaurant, which rented space in a publicly
owned parking building in Wilmington, Delaware, refused to serve the
plaintiff because he was black. The suit against the restaurant and the
state agency operating the parking building sought injunctive relief on
the ground that the actions of the state agency and the private restaurant violated the plaintiffs fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection. 2 The Supreme Court of Delaware held that because the
restaurant was a purely private entity, no relief could be afforded the
plaintiff under the fourteenth amendment, which proscribed only discriminatory actions of a state.8 3 The Delaware Court also held that it
was legal for the restaurant to exclude the black man because a Delaware statute provided that no restaurant owner could be required to
serve a customer "whose reception or entertainment by him would be
offensive
to the major part of his customers, and would injure his busi84
ness."
A majority of the Court found the requisite state action in the symbi79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 756.
Eg., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id. at 717 & n.I.
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otic relationship between the state, which owned the parking facility,
and the restaurant, which rented space in it.
The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be
considered to have been so "purely
8 5 private" as to fall without the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This language sowed the seeds for a potentially massive expansion of
the parameters of state action. The concept of "government insinuation" into an otherwise private business was broad enough to reach a
host of private enterprises. The Court was clearly aware of this danger,
and the majority attempted to forestall such a broad reading of the
opinion by "[sipecifically defining the limits" of the decision to the sort
of leasehold situation at issue in the case.86
Justice Stewart concurred with the judgment, but resisted expansion
of the definition of state action to cover the leasehold situation. 87 He
foresaw a slippery slope leading to ever-widening federal intervention
in this area. As in United States v. Guest, he searched the record for
evidence of a more conventional indication of state action that would
afford a basis for relief. He found what he was looking for in the Delaware statute that authorized innkeepers to exclude whomever they
deemed potentially offensive to their guests. His one paragraph concurrence was clear, short, logical, and in the Stewart style:
I agree that the judgment must be reversed, but I reach that conclusion by a route much more direct than the one traveled by the Court.
In upholding Eagle's right to deny service to the appellant solely because of his race, the Supreme Court of Delaware relied upon a statute
of that State which permits the proprietor of a restaurant to refuse to
serve "persons whose reception or entertainment by him would be offensive to the major part of his customers . . . ." There is no suggestion in the record that the appellant as an individual was such a person.
The highest court of Delaware has thus construed this legislative enactment as authorizing discriminatory classification based exclusively on
color. Such a law seems to me clearly violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I think, therefore, that the appeal was properly taken,
and that the statute, as authoritatively construed by the Supreme Court
of Delaware, is constitutionally invalid.8"
By relying on the specific statute, rather than on an expanded definition of "state action," Justice Stewart accomplished his objective of
achieving justice without sowing the seeds of a significant expansion in
federal power. His opinion illustrates the predilection of Justice Stew85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 725.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 726-27.
Id.
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art's jurisprudence-to promote equality within prudently drawn restraints on government power. His opinion also illustrates his penchant
for writing decisions that go no further than the facts of a particular
case permit and do no less than those facts require.
POST-WARREN COURT CONTRIBUTIONS

If I were to speculate on Justice Stewart's reaction to contrapuntal
characterizations of the "Warren Court" and the "Burger Court," I suspect that he would reject them. I suspect that he would say that the
Court is a continuum with occasional changes in membership and that
the past-its past-is prelude. As prelude, that past, and the decisions
which constitute that past, cannot be disregarded and should be built

upon.
The substance with which the equal protection clause is endowed
today stems largely from the judicial initiatives taken by the Warren
Court. In certain areas, that substance has been enhanced in the postWarren era. To the extent that this is so, Justice Stewart, as a senior,89
although still relatively young member of the Burger Court, bore a considerable portion of the responsibility and should receive a considerable portion of the credit. I believe that there are four characteristic
areas of Justice Stewart's post-Warren Court judicial activities that
mandate comment.
1. He continued to apply the civil rights statutes to situations involving
invidious,purposeful discrimination.
One contribution of the Warren Court that Justice Stewart has continued is the reanimation of the thirteenth amendment as a constitutional imperative. His efforts in this direction, dramatically begun in
Jones v. Mayer, were renewed in Griffin v. Breckenridge.9
The facts in Groin were truly compelling. The plaintiffs were black
residents of DeKalb, Mississippi. While they were driving along a public highway, a large truck suddenly cut them off and forced them to the
side of the road. Two armed white men sprang from the truck, pointed
guns at the frightened blacks, threatened to kill them, and clubbed
them until they were badly injured.9 The plaintiffs sought damages in
federal court for an alleged violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,92
which establishes a cause of action for damages caused by a conspiracy
to deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
89. Upon his retirement, Justice Stewart had served on the Court longer than any other Justice with the exception of Justice Brennan.
90. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
91. Id. at 90-91.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1979 & Supp. Ill1979).
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93
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities-under the laws ....
The issue in Griffin was whether this aged statute could, consistently
with the Constitution, authorize an action by private citizens against
other private citizens when there was no participation by the state in
the objectionable activity and no other trace of state action. The district court dismissed the action on the authority of a twenty-year old
case 94 that had interpreted the statute to require that any objectionable
activity must have been committed under color of state law. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reluctantly affirmed. 9
Building on the base that he had established in Jones v. Mayer, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, upheld the petitioners' right to
maintain the action under section 1985(3) against the private parties.
Drawing on the language of the statute, the interpretation of related
civil rights laws, and on legislative history, he rejected the argument
that state action was a necessary predicate for recovery.9 6 Griffin, like
Jones v. Mayer, represented a fresh and powerful interpretation of the
thirteenth amendment and of the words "equal protection" which freed
them from the operational limitations and encrustations that had developed in years of interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. As Justice Stewart wrote:
A century of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication has, in other words,
made it understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a
deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by private persons. Yet
there is nothing inherent in the phrase [equal protection] that requires
the action working the deprivation to come from the State. 97
In Abemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,9 8 another case involving statutory
interpretation, Justice Stewart once again wrote an opinion affording
broader relief under the civil rights statutes. The statute in question
was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 99 The subject matter of
the action was, as to this locale, literally close to home. The plaintiffs,
black employees at a paper mill in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina,
sought a permanent injunction to stop certain employment practices."0
The paper mill, which had historically discriminated against blacks, required any person seeking to transfer from an unskilled to a higherpaid skilled position to pass tests of verbal ability and nonverbal intelligence.101
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817, 825-27 (5th Cir. 1969).
403 U.S. at 95-96.
403 U.S. at 97.
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-12 (1976)).
422 U.S. at 409.
Id. at 410-11.
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Four years earlier, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,102 the Supreme
Court recognized that such tests were often used as instruments of blatant discrimination. The Court in Griggs had unanimously set forth a
requirement that such performance tests were unlawful when they had
the effect of discriminating against blacks, unless the tests could be
shown to relate to job performance.10 3 Justice Stewart's opinion in Albemarle Papet closed a potential loophole by narrowly limiting the use
of such performance tests to situations where the employers could
demonstrate, according to exacting scientific standards, that the tests in
fact were job related."'.
2. He wrote important opinions that continue the tortuousprocess of
implementing the revolutionarydesegregation mandate of
Brown v. Board of Education.
Justice Stewart will be remembered for his role in the Court's effort
to compel actual implementation of the desegregation mandate set
forth in Brown v. Board of Education.5 Although the Court had
boldly declared in 1954 that "[s]eparate educational facitilities are inherently unequal,"'" compliance with that decision proceeded slowly
as school districts experimented with various devices aimed at evading
the Brown mandate. They sought delays in implementing desegregation because of hostile public reactions." ° They implemented plans
permitting voluntary transfers' 018 or "freedom of choice" systems"°
which served simply to perpetuate segregation rather than dismantle it.
Finally, in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoardof Education, 0 the
Court gave precise instructions designed to effect actual desegregation
in the schools.
Justice Stewart's commitment to securing meaningful compliance
with Brown is apparent in a pair of decisions handed down after
Swann. In both Wright v. Council of Emporia"' and United States v.
Scotland Neck City Board of Education,12 the Court was confronted
with attempts by government units to avoid dismantling dual school
systems by carving out a separate school district predominantly for
white children. In Wright, the city of Emporia, Virginia, which for
102. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
103. Id. at 436.

104. 422 U.S. at 425.
105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
106. Id. at 495.

107. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
108. See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
109. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).

110. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
111. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
112. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
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years had been a part of the surrounding county's school system, sud-3
denly decided to cut its ties to the county and run its own schools.'"
The Court found it significant that this decision coincided with a federal court order to desegregate the surrounding county. The net result
would have been predominantly white city schools and a predominantly black county school system. In Scotland4 Neck, a similar evasive
tactic was attempted by the state legislature."
In Wright the Court held that creation of new school boundary lines
which impeded the desegregation process was forbidden. Writing for
the five-to-four majority, Justice Stewart rejected the finding of the
court of appeals that boundary realignment could be permitted if the
"dominant purpose" of the changes would I"further the aim of providing quality education."' " 5 Reviewing the remedial decisions following
Brown, Justice Stewart concluded: "[W]e have focused upon the effect-not the purpose or motivation--of a school board's action in determining whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a dual
system. The existence of a permissible' 6purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect." "
Justice Stewart carefully reviewed the claims that local school control was necessary to provide the best education for the children of the
city.'
Since his Yale days, Justice Stewart has respected the autonomy of decision makers elected by the democratic process. This concern is present in Wright. The Justice notes that "[d]irect control over
decisions vitally affecting the education of one's children is a need that
is strongly felt in our society."' I 8 However, it is equally clear from the
opinion that Justice Stewart is not hesitant to recommend judicial intervention where the democratic process has failed because discrete and
insular minorities have not been adequately represented. Thus, in
Wright, Justice Stewart observed: "In evaluating Emporia's claims, it
must be remembered that the city represents the interests of less than
one-third of the students in the system being desegregated." ' 9 According to Justice Stewart, therefore, judicial restraint may be appropriate
where the elective system really works, but he seems to also say that
courts should not shy from their remedial responsibilities when their
assistance is sought by those who have no recourse in representative
bodies.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

407 U.S. at 454-55.
407 U.S. at 485-87.
407 U.S. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 467.
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3.

He effectively invoked precedent to moderate the more restrictive
approachesof some of his colleagues to individualliberty and
equality

Justice Stewart has also helped to temper the tendency toward division within the Court. Sometimes his influence has been manifested
through a concurring opinion in which he attempts to narrow or
reshape the majority opinion, to bridge some of the distance between
the majority and the dissenters, or to leave room for more flexible doctrinal development in the next case.
A good example of this dialectical interaction is in the development
of the Court's approach to multidistrict desegregation remedies. In the
five-to-four decision of Milliken v. Bradley, 2 0 the Court reversed a district court order that required the State of Michigan to draft desegregation plans for Detroit which encompassed the outlying suburban school
districts---even though the outlying school districts were neither parties
2
to the action nor targets of any charge of constitutional wrong-doing.' '
The majority opinion, written by the Chief Justice, stressed the value
of local control over the school system:
No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and
support
for public schools and to the quality of the educational pro22
cess. 1

Although the majority conceded that a multidistrict remedy might be
appropriate on the proper facts,' 23 it was not hospitable to such a remedy. It quite explicitly described the complications that would result
from a multidistrict remedy in Detroit. 24 In describing one set of facts
that might call for multidistrict relief, it emphasized the barriers to such
a remedy:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may
be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or
by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there
has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a
sign/icant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be
shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantialcause of interdistrict segregation. Thus an interdistrict remedy might be in order
where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts
caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 741-42.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 743.
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25
have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race.'
The majority also stated that multidistrict relief in Detroit could "be
supported only by drastic expansion of the constitutionalright itself, an
expansion without any support in either constitutional principle or precedent."'2 1 6 This language of the majority seemed to signal strong
resistance to multidistrict remedies, but Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion struck a moderate tone in characterizing the Court's decision.
Justice Stewart shifted the terms of the debate, focusing the Court's
attention on the particular facts of the case before it, thus trying to keep
doors open for future development: "In the present posture of the case
. . .the Court does not deal with questions of substantive constitutional law. The basic issue now before the Court concerns, rather, the
appropriate exercise of federal equity jurisdiction."'' 27 His concurrence
also illustrated when a multidistrict remedy "might well be appropriate," but concluded that no remedy affecting the suburban units could
be fashioned because there was no evidence of wrongdoing outside the
city. 128

Justice Stewart's concurring opinion rested on a far narrower basis
than that of the majority. According to Justice Stewart, the key to the

case was that "[t]he formulation of an interdistrict remedy was ...
simply not responsive to the factual record before the District Court
and was an abuse of that court's equitable powers." 129
Did Justice Stewart's concurrence have impact upon subsequent development in this area of the law? In the very next case involving multidistrict remedies, Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion
upholding, as a matter of law, the power of a district court to compel
the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development to remedy
constitutional violations in the center city by ordering a metropolitan
area relief plan. 3 ' He noted that "[n]othing in the Milliken decision
suggests aper se rule that federal courts lack authority to order parties
found to have violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts
beyond the municipal boundaries of the city where the violation occurred."''
He also described how the record in this case evidenced
constitutional wrongdoing by the federal housing authority that justified metropolitan area-wide relief. 32 The opinion thus reflects the impact of Justice Stewart's original concurrence in Milliken, which calmly
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 744-45 (emphasis added).
Id. at 747 (emphasis added).
Id. at 753.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 756.
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
Id. at 298.
Id. at 298-300.
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relief could be available at the right time
maintained the multidistrict
33
and in the right place.'
While Justice Stewart has used the power of separate concurrence to
limit the impact of some of the Court's most recent decisions, he has
also, on important occasions, joined with those members of the present
Court who find themselves increasingly in the role of dissenters.
Of the recent cases, United Steelworkers v. Weber134 stands out.
Weber raised the question whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 3 1 barred voluntary race-conscious affirmative action plans "to
eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories." ' 36 The outcome of the case was in significant doubt 37 in the
wake of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.' 38 Title VII
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual because of his race. 139 The Court in Bakke had given little hint of
how it would react to a challenge under Title VII to voluntary raceconscious amelioratory measures. In Weber, Justice Stewart joined in
Justice Brennan's majority opinion, which denied a Title VII challenge
to voluntary affirmative action programs designed to redress past discrimination in the workplace. 4 °
4. He evidenced an increasedtension between the value of equality, on
the one hand,and other values that have always been
important to him, such as the restraintof government
power.
While Justice Stewart has joined with his brethren to strengthen
equal protection and has used the power of the concurring opinion to
moderate the impact of various opinions of the Court, his decisions
continue to reflect a certain tension between his commitment to equal
protection and his concern for other democratic ideals, such as the restraint of overreaching government power and the protection of individual rights. Sometimes this tension produces results which, at the
threshold, are surprising.
The minority business enterprise provision of the Public Works Employment Act' 4 1 was recently challenged in Fullilove v. Klutznick .142
133. 418 U.S. at 755.
134. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
136. 443 U.S. at 197.
137. See, e.g., Larson, Race Consciousnessin Employment afterBakke, 14 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS
Civ. LiB. L. REV. 215, 250-54 (1979).
138. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976).
140. 443 U.S. at 197.
141. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 6701 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
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This provision requires that ten percent of the federal public works
grants be set aside for minority business enterprises. !43 Justice Stewart
dissented from the majority opinion upholding the minority business
enterprise provision.'" He characterized the program as constituting
"by definition invidious discrimination," and in itself a violation of
equal protection. 45 "No race, . . ." he wrote, "has a monopoly on social, educational, or economic disadvantage, and any law that indulges
in such a presumption
clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of
46
equal protection."'1
At first view, Justice Stewart's dissent in Fullilove seems puzzling,
given his position in Weber, but on second analysis, Justice Stewart's
position is not as unexpected as it first might have seemed. The dissent
was grounded in equal protection considerations. In Milliken v. Bradley 14 and in Hills v. Gautreaux, 14 Justice Stewart evinced concern for
intruding upon the autonomy of local governments when no constitutional wrongdoing had been demonstrated. When the violation was
factually demonstrated, as in Gautreaux, he led the Court in authorizing action. But as he showed in Milliken, he is unwilling to sacrifice
other values where the constitutional violation has not been adequately
established.
Justice Stewart has joined the majority of the Court in holding that
facially neutral government action could be overturned under fourteenth amendment strict scrutiny only upon a showing that it was carried out with a discriminatory purpose. Discriminatory impact, under
the line of cases that began with Washington v. Davis,'1 and developed
through the recent Stewart decision in PersonnelAdministrator v. Feeney, 150 is not enough to trigger the strict scrutiny of the fourteenth
amendment. Justice Stewart's support of the. discriminatory purpose
requirement comports with his consistent respect for the autonomy of
local governing units. The Court has recognized that strict scrutiny is a
powerful weapon which perhaps should be turned upon the actions of
administrators and legislators only after a demonstration that the discretion afforded them by the democratic process has been infected with
racial animus. 15 1 Justice Stewart's opinion in the Feeney case reflects
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

448 U.S. 448 (1980).
42 U.S.C. § 6701 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
448 U.S. at 522.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 529-30.

147. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).

148.
149.
150.
151.
COLUM.

425 U.S. 284 (1976).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Note, DiscriminatoryPurposeandDisproportionateImpact."An Assessment after Feeny, 79
L. REV. 1376, 1383 (1979).
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his basic faith that courts should resist intruding into government activity when the decision-making is free from the distorting influence of
racism: "When some other independent right is not at stake, and when
there is no 'reason to infer antipathy,' it is presumed that 'even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process.' "152
CONCLUSION
I have reviewed certain of the contributions that Justice Stewart has
made to the jurisprudence of equal protection. Obviously I have not,
in this short presentation, mined all the riches of his twenty-two years
of service as a Supreme Court Justice. The areas I have touched upon
demonstrate, I believe, Justice Stewart's penetrating resourcefulness
and creativity as a judge. As we move into the 1980's, equal protection's solid jurisprudential grounding plainly bears the mark of his
work.
His equal protection opinions are many, and the creativity, thoroughness, and care with which those opinions have been crafted insure
their durability. But in my judgment, Justice Stewart's most enduring
contribution-extending beyond equal protection to all his work and
the work of his colleagues as well-has been his insistence upon respect
by the Court for its own precedents. We honor, yesterday and today,
one of the legacies of the Warren Court: a revitalized doctrine of
"equal protection of the laws." 'That it is a legacy, and not an historical
curiosity, may be attributable, in some considerable measure, to the
creativity and craftsmanship of Justice Potter Stewart.

152. 442 U.S. 272 (citations omitted).
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